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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE FALSE HOPE OF MISSOURI’S AMENDMENT NINE AND THE
REAL PROBLEMS WITH CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF
ELECTRONIC DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS FROM
GOVERNMENT INTRUSION

INTRODUCTION
On August 5, 2014, Missouri voters passed Amendment Nine to the
Missouri Constitution. 1 The amendment (hereafter “Amendment Nine”)
changed the text of Article I, Section 15, Missouri’s analog to the United States
Constitution’s Fourth Amendment, to include protections for “electronic data”
and “electronic communications” in the enumerated list that previously tracked
the language of the Fourth Amendment: “persons, papers, homes, and
effects.” 2 The bill introducing Amendment Nine was sponsored by Republican
State Senators Rob Schaaf and Bob Dixon. 3 Amendment Nine passed by a
74.25% to 25.75% vote in the statewide election. 4
In late June, shortly before the Missouri election, the United States
Supreme Court decided Riley v. California. 5 Riley held that the warrantless
search of the contents of a cell phone incident to an arrest was a violation of
the Fourth Amendment, other than in extremely rare situations where the
phone itself presents a danger. 6 Many questioned whether Amendment Nine
would have any effect in the wake of Riley. 7
In a recent Missouri case, a party argued that Amendment Nine
“demonstrates a clear public policy choice” to protect “citizens’ electronic
data” from “harvesting” by the government. 8 The argument that Amendment

1. Missouri Electronic Data Protection, Amendment 9 (August 2014), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Electronic_Data_Protection,_Amendment_9_(August_2014)
[http://perma.cc/PH2N-LT6B] [hereinafter BALLOTPEDIA] (last visited July 16, 2015).
2. MO. CONST. art. I, § 15; BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 1.
3. Kevin McDermott, Proposed Missouri Amendment Would Extend Privacy Protection to
Cell Phones, Email, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 22, 2014, at A1, http://www.stltoday.com/
news/local/govt-and-politics/proposed-missouri-amendment-would-extend-privacy-protection-tocell-phones/article_53aa9cb5-b73b-5008-9805-c45ebe73e29e.html [http://perma.cc/S7XF-V8
7A]; BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 1.
4. BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 1.
5. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
6. Id. at 2495.
7. See infra Part I.B.
8. Brief of Appellees at 33, State ex rel Koster v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 851
(Mo. Ct. App. May 26, 2015).
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Nine be given effect continued, saying “[Amendment Nine] also demonstrates
a policy choice to bolster privacy protections . . . .” 9 Although the trial court
did not reach this argument, the Western District of the Court of Appeals did:
“Because the Fourth Amendment is already being interpreted to protect
electronic communications and data, we conclude that article I, section 15,
even as amended, is not currently measurably more restrictive on the
government than is the Fourth Amendment.” 10
This analysis will argue that the Western District was correct: Amendment
Nine should have no more than expressive effect because current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence at the federal and state levels already extends to
electronic data and communication. The real controversy in this area exists in
the application of third party doctrine of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The courts have established a relatively well developed third party doctrine,
but there remains a controversy over how to determine when data has been
voluntarily given to a third party carrier. Part of this controversy might lead to
the adoption of a different rule for collecting real-time or prospective data and
communications as opposed to historic or stored data and communications.
Amendment Nine offers no help to Missouri in resolving this controversy.
Part I explores the motives for Amendment Nine and the debate
surrounding it. Because the third party doctrine is why electronic data and
communication is often not protected, Part II introduces and describes that
doctrine. Part III describes the state of Missouri law prior to Amendment Nine.
Part IV examines some of the principal electronic data and electronic
technologies before reviewing the vanishing “circuit split” surrounding the
application of third party doctrine to cases involving third party collection of
cell site location information (CSLI). Part V refines the controversy to
determine what Missouri’s options in handling such a case might be. Part VI
shows that Amendment Nine will not help Missouri decide this controversy.
I. PASSAGE OF AMENDMENT NINE
A.

Amendment Nine was motivated by concerns regarding widespread use of
newer technologies

Use of electronic data and electronic communications has become
ubiquitous in twenty-first century America. According to the United States
Census Bureau, as of 2013, nearly 85% of households in the United States
“reported computer ownership,” and nearly 75% of households had home

9. Id.
10. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 461 S.W.3d at 857–58.
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internet access. 11 The Pew Research Center reports that in January 2014, 90%
of American adults owned a cell phone, 58% of adults owned a smart phone,
and 42% of adults owned a tablet computer. 12 In 2013, there were an estimated
833 million Twitter accounts, with new accounts registering at a rate of over
one million per month. 13 In 2010, there were over 133 million Facebook
subscribers in the United States. 14 And we Americans use our data generating
and transmitting technology constantly. Of the cited Twitter accounts, 233
million were “monthly active users.” 15 In 2014, 71% of online adults used
Facebook, while growing numbers of them used competing social media. 16
Daily, or even hourly, we create, store, and transmit electronic data about
nearly every aspect of our lives. 17
Along with our unprecedented use of technology that creates, stores, and
transmits data comes concern for protection of that data from government
intrusion. As Justice Sotomayor observed in her concurring opinion in United
States v. Jones, previously restraints on law enforcement information gathering
came from “limited police resources and community hostility” rather than
constitutional limits. 18 New technologies make possible, for example,
inexpensive, unobtrusive, and continuous, long-term tracking of a vehicle’s
movements in public places. 19 Without the physical restraints, and without
some change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the vast amounts of
information people emanate nearly non-stop (and often without specific user
awareness) might be accessible to law enforcement. 20 Concern for protection

11. Thom File & Camille Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States: American
Community Survey Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 2014), http://www.census.gov/content/
dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-28.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3KA-VYZH].
12. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR., http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/
mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ [http://perma.cc/D8MJ-TTAE] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
13. Jim Edwards, Twitter’s ‘Dark Pool’: IPO Didn’t Mention 651 Million Users Who
Abandoned Twitter, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 3, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/twitter-totalregistered-users-v-monthly-active-users-2013-11 [http://perma.cc/58WG-8YA2].
14. United States of America Internet and User Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS,
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats26.htm [http://perma.cc/T5ZJ-CT65] (last visited Mar.
28, 2015).
15. Edwards, supra note 13.
16. Maeve Duggan et al., Social Media Update 2014, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 9, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/01/09/social-media-update-2014/ [http://perma.cc/ZG49-V2
EX].
17. E.g., Kathryn Nobuko Horwath, A Check-In on Privacy After United States v. Jones:
Current Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence in the Context of Location-Based Applications and
Services, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 925, 925–26 (2013) (describing just a portion of the
information a typical person distributes via Twitter, Facebook, etc. throughout a typical day).
18. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 955–56.
20. E.g., Horwath, supra note 17, at 925–26 (describing just a portion of the information a
typical person distributes via Twitter, Facebook, and Foursquare throughout a typical day).
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of this data from government searches grew dramatically following Edward
Snowden’s revelation in June of 2013 that the National Security
Administration was collecting in bulk cell phone metadata. 21
B.

The debate focused on whether Amendment Nine would have any effect,
and not on whether it was a good or bad idea in itself

In Missouri, this concern brought together a wide range of organizations in
support of Amendment Nine: from liberal to libertarian and beyond. 22
Proponent organizations included the Missouri American Civil Liberties
Union, the Missouri Libertarian Party, the Missouri NAACP, and the Tenth
Amendment Center (TAC). 23 TAC claims Amendment Nine is part of a
broader agenda aimed at nullification of federal law (that is, promoting states’
rights). 24 TAC is a member of OffNow, a coalition promoting model
legislation aimed at state non-cooperation with federal authorities. 25 OffNow
also sees Amendment Nine (what it calls the “Electronic Data Privacy Act”) as
a stepping stone to nullification laws aimed at restraining federal surveillance
practices. 26 More mainstream thinkers perceive the need for a state role in

21. Barton Gellman, NSA Surveillance: The Architecture; Four-Pronged U.S. Approach
Relies Heavily on Data Behind Internet, Phone Communications, WASH. POST, June 16, 2013, at
A1; Tobias T. Gibson, Why Amendment Nine Matters, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB., Aug. 17, 2014,
http://www.columbiatribune.com/opinion/oped/why-amendment-matters/article_3d3d0e9e-17f55008-8a89-8b4f3276e543.html [http://perma.cc/LQ34-R5MA].
22. Vote Yes on Amendment 9, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION OF MO., http://www.aclu-mo.org
/legislation/2014-privacy-bills/vote-yes-on-amendment-9/ [http://perma.cc/2MEG-Z8TK] [herein
after ACLU-MO] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
23. Id.
24. Vote to Nullify: Five States, Seven Ballot Measures, TENTH AMEND. CTR., http://tentha
mendmentcenter.com/2014/11/03/vote-to-nullify-five-states-seven-ballot-measures/ [http://perma.
cc/6X66-GZ9F] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
25. Standing Together Against the Surveillance State, OFFNOW, http://www.offnow.org/coa
lition [http://perma.cc/67EZ-XLUK] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015). Another blogger writes,
The only lasting hope for freedom from government consolidation of all power is the
refusal by states to enforce or participate in any federal program not specifically
authorized by the contract that created that power in the first place— the Constitution.
Lawmakers in Missouri are to be applauded for their effort to enforce the terms of the
contract that created federal authority in the first place.
He supports Amendment Nine in part because he feels that relying on the courts to protect us
from government intrusion is a bad idea. Joe Wolverton, II, Amendment to Missouri Constitution
Would Protect Digital Communication, THE NEW AM. (June 25, 2014), http://www.thenewameri
can.com/usnews/constitution/item/18558-amendment-to-mo-constitution-would-protect-digitalcommunication [http://perma.cc/96L7-KMFC].
26. See Model Legislation, OFFNOW, http://www.offnow.org/legislation [http://perma.cc/3J
DT-XHMA] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
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protecting or extending Fourth Amendment protections in the light of new
technology. 27
What little opposition there was to Amendment Nine suggested that it was
unnecessary or would not have an effect. 28 Most of these opponents point to
Riley. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch (hereafter the “Post”) said Amendment
Nine was “the least bad” of the amendments on the August ballot. 29 The Post
opposed the change because it believed the Supreme Court (presumably in
Riley) already offered the same protections and that it would “rather see this
issue dealt with at the federal level.” 30 Other opponents included: West Plains
Daily Quill, citing Riley explicitly; 31 the News Tribune, claiming “a statewide
amendment is insufficient to address ever-expanding technologies,
communications and privacy issues;” 32 the Joplin Globe, pointing to “costly,
burdensome legal challenges that tie up the court system” in response to
unnecessary constitutional amendments; 33 The Columbia Daily Tribune,
pointing to Riley to claim the amendment is “redundant” and would just be
“clutter;” 34 and The Kansas City Star, saying the amendment has a good intent
but there has been “too little discussion about the potential consequences” and
they would rather see the subject “more thoroughly explored by the courts and
in legislative debate before it is enshrined in the Missouri constitution.” 35

27. ACLU-MO, supra note 22; Gibson, supra note 21; Stephen E. Henderson, Learning
from All Fifty States: How to Apply the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs to Protect Third
Party Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 373–74, 393–94 (2006).
28. “Opponents do not castigate the amendment as potentially harmful, only that it is an
unnecessary, ‘feel-good’ state policy likely to be superseded by federal law.” Editorial, Our
Opinion: Amendment Won’t Be Final Word on Digital Privacy Issue, NEWS TRIB., July 31, 2014,
http://www.newstribune.com/news/news/story/2014/jul/31/our-opinion-amendment-wont-befinal-word-digital-p/438004/ [http://perma.cc/6VQX-3DK6].
29. Editorial, Just Vote No, No, No, No and No, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 3, 2014, at
A18.
30. Id.
31. Frank L. Martin, Editorial, Amendment 9 Is Unnecessary, WEST PLAINS DAILY QUILL
(Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.westplainsdailyquill.net/opinion/editorials/article_5c5277c8-199911e4-8dc4-0017a43b2370.html [http://perma.cc/36E9-G6JJ].
32. Editorial, NEWS TRIB., supra note 28.
33. Editorial, Our View: No Need for No. 9, JOPLIN GLOBE (July 29, 2014), http://www.jop
linglobe.com/opinion/editorials/our-view-no-need-for-no/article_f3c48511-a3f9-5f1a-86f1-012
cc003a5d4.html [http://perma.cc/Y42V-4SKT].
34. Henry J. Waters, III, Editorial, Amendments: Cluttering the Constitution, COLUMBIA
DAILY TRIB. (July 27, 2014), http://www.columbiatribune.com/opinion/the_tribunes_view/
amendments/article_236e5a28-110f-564a-b46e-c230342ddb14.html [http://perma.cc/WA53-9P
LF].
35. Tammy L. Jungblad, Editorial, Vote “No” on Gun and Data Questions in Missouri, THE
KANSAS CITY STAR, (June 23, 2014), http://www.kansascity.com/opinion/editorials/article591
383.html [http://perma.cc/QK5B-G5B2].
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Some less than enthusiastic supporters echoed some of the less than
enthusiastic opponents because they believe Amendment Nine was harmless,
even if it was likely unnecessary and ineffective. 36
C. Riley is irrelevant
Proponents responded to the claim that Riley mooted Amendment Nine by
pointing out that Riley’s holding was limited to the warrantless search of a cell
phone seized directly from a person incident to arrest. 37 Riley made no other
new pronouncements on questions concerning Fourth Amendment protection
for electronic data and electronic communications. While the opinion
contained the observation that a cell phone was analogous to other electronic
devices, such as cameras, desktop and laptop computers, tablets, flash drives,
and so on, 38 that the Fourth Amendment protected data stored on such devices
was not a new holding. 39 Perhaps more significantly, Riley made no holding on
third party search doctrine. 40 Its only addition to protection of electronic data
was limited to the question of whether a cell phone can be searched incident to
an arrest under one or another exception. 41

36. The Sullivan Journal, for example, recommended a “yes” vote but considered the matter
resolved by Riley. Editorial, Say “No” to Amendment 7 and Amendment 1 Right to Farm,
SULLIVAN J. (Aug. 3, 2014), http://www.sullivanjournal.com/editorial/article_56fa7ad8-1b0f-11
e4-a3a4-0017a43b2370.html [http://perma.cc/A9MA-NN5N].
37. E.g., Frequently Asked Questions About Amendment 9, ACLU-MO, http://www.aclumo.org/legislation/2014-privacy-bills/vote-yes-on-amendment-9/frequently-asked-questionsabout-amendment-9/ [http://perma.cc/RRH3-QG5V] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
38. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have
the capacity to be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players,
rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or
newspapers.”).
39. The fact that such electronic data falls under Fourth Amendment protection is generally
assumed. For example, in City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, the Supreme Court resolved a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the search of a police officer’s text message on government-owned
pagers. The analysis did not depend on the idea that the mere fact that it was electronic data
somehow put it beyond the scope of the Fourth Amendment, but rather depended on the fact that
the texts were work-related and were stored on pagers owned by the city. City of Ontario, Cal. v.
Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 750–51, 764–65 (2010).
40. Riley broached this issue by observing that it may be difficult to discern what data is
stored on the cell phone and what is stored remotely, on a “cloud” server, for example, and
merely accessed via the cell phone. However, the case only addressed the question of searching
the data from the phone seized incident to arrest, and did not address the question of getting that
same data somehow from the third party that stored a copy of it. In fact, the government conceded
that there was no Chimel exception that allowed for the warrantless search of that remotely stored
data. That is, the government only wanted to search data stored exclusively locally on the cell
phone. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
41. Id. at 2485–89, 2494–95.
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Furthermore, Riley did not touch at all on the topic of electronic
communications, treating the cell phone simply as the repository of stored
data. 42 However, since at least 1967, the Supreme Court has recognized Fourth
Amendment protection for electronic communications. 43 In Katz, police
installed a device on the outside of a public phone booth that allowed them to
listen to the suspect’s phone conversation. 44 The Court rejected the older rule
that defined Fourth Amendment violations as only those involving a trespass
into a constitutionally protected place, famously holding, “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.” 45 The two-part Katz test, recognizing
Fourth Amendment protection when there is both an actual or subjective
expectation of privacy, and society recognizes that expectation as reasonable, 46
extended Fourth Amendment protection to the suspect’s telephone
conversation, which is a form of electronic communication.
Thus, although proponents were correct in pointing out that Riley was not
relevant to the Amendment Nine debate, they were wrong in assuming that
electronic data and electronic communications were not already subject to
Fourth Amendment protection. 47
II. THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
A.

The Rule

As we will see, Fourth Amendment protection from “first party” searches
of electronic data and communications has long been recognized in Missouri
under the Fourth Amendment and coextensively under Missouri’s Constitution.
The third party doctrine, which says that a person has no expectation of
privacy, and therefore no Fourth Amendment interest, in information
voluntarily given to a third party 48 is the reason collection of electronic data
and communications often falls outside Fourth Amendment protections. Put
simply, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy regarding what he or

42. But see supra note 40.
43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
44. Id. at 348.
45. Id. at 351.
46. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
47. That proponents made this assumption is clear from Amendment Nine’s ballot language:
“Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended so that the people shall be secure in their electronic
communications and data from unreasonable searches and seizures as they are now likewise
secure in their persons, homes, papers and effects?” BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 1 (emphasis
added).
48. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
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she exposes to the public or voluntarily gives to another. 49 Stephen Henderson
considers this a blanket rule of federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
[A]s interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the [Fourth] Amendment
places no restriction on police combing through your financial records; your
telephone, e-mail, and website transactional records; and your garbage left for
collection. Instead “third party information,” meaning all information provided
to third parties, receives no Fourth Amendment protection. Hence your very
movements, be they tracked via a police transponder placed on your vehicle or
via your mobile phone, are seemingly available to police without any Fourth
50
Amendment limitation.

Jennifer Arner points out that with regard to e-mail, therefore, the difference
between using Post Office Protocol 3 (POP3, which stores messages locally
and deletes them from the mail server) and Internet Message Access Protocol
(IMAP, which leaves messages on the server) is the difference between having
and not having Fourth Amendment protection available. 51
However, when the third party is an “intermediary” or “carrier,” not all of
the data is considered voluntarily given to that third party carrier. 52 Orin Kerr
suggests it is helpful to analogize to third party doctrine dealing with physical
things so that our rules are technology-neutral. 53 He argues that non-content
information is like the outside of letters and packages given to the third party
carrier. 54 The Ninth Circuit has noted:
[i]n a line of cases dating back to the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
has held that the government cannot engage in a warrantless search of the
contents of sealed mail, but can observe whatever information people put on

49. In a way, this question is similar to the question of “standing” in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights and cannot be asserted vicariously.
E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978). For example, an employee had no expectation
of privacy of the contents of a computer owned by his employer. State v. Faruqi, 344 S.W.3d 193,
204–05 (Mo. 2011). That these two doctrines overlap is apparent from the following hypothetical:
police illegally enter my friend’s house and seize a letter I wrote and mailed to my friend. I have
no standing to suppress that letter as evidence against me because I have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the letter I voluntarily gave to a third party and because I have no
standing to challenge the illegal entry of my friend’s house.
50. Henderson, supra note 27, at 373.
51. Jennifer Arner, Looking Forward by Looking Backward: United States v. Jones Predicts
Fourth Amendment Property Rights Protections in E-Mail, 24 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 349,
349–50 (2014).
52. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (“NuVox was an
intermediary, not the intended recipient of the emails.”).
53. Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1022–23 (2010).
54. Id.
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the outside of mail, because that information is voluntarily transmitted to third
55
parties.

In Smith v. Maryland, back in the days when most homes had landline
telephones, the Supreme Court examined the question of whether installation
of a pen register is a Fourth Amendment search. 56 A pen register is a device
installed at the telephone company that captures phone numbers dialed by a
given telephone but does not intercept the conversation or content of the call. 57
The Court distinguished the case from Katz on that very content/non-content
distinction, holding that “a pen register differs significantly from the listening
device employed in Katz, for pen registers do not acquire the contents of
communications.” 58
When the third party is an “intermediary” or “carrier” of information to
another recipient, only the “outside” or “non-content” data is considered
voluntarily given to the carrier third party. The content is still protected by the
Fourth Amendment with respect to the third party carriers. The content is,
however, voluntarily given to the third party recipient who is free to turn it
over to law enforcement. Another way courts have explained essentially the
same distinction is to consider which data the third party carrier needs to
receive from the subscriber to provide its service—the sort of data it needs and
normally stores as part of conducting its business. 59
B.

The assumption underlying Amendment Nine ignores the third party rule

A great deal of the electronic data and communications motivating
proponents of Amendment Nine involve the third party rule: information
uploaded to internet servers, information transmitted to cell phone service
providers, location data broadcast by a vehicle’s OnStar system, and so on.
When dealing with physically recorded information (which easily fit into the
constitutionally-protected categories “papers” or “effects”), there is normally
little doubt as to when we have voluntarily given the information to another or
made it available to the public. As we will see, the question of when we

55. United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 511 (9th Cir. 2008).
56. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 (1979).
57. Id. at 736 n.1.
58. Id. at 741.
59. Id. at 743 (“Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical
information to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for recording this
information; and that the phone company does in fact record this information for a variety of
legitimate business purposes.”). Also note: the business record approach illustrates why the fact
that the user has no Fourth Amendment interest leads to the idea that the government can compel
disclosure by the third party carrier under the lesser standard of the SCA. The data as a business
record is owned by the phone company, but it has no privacy interest in it—unlike trade secrets or
personnel records. In other words, the user cannot vicariously assert property interests in the data,
and the entity with property interests has no privacy interest in it.
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voluntarily give electronic data to a third party is a more controversial
question. 60 However, the distinction between information that is and is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment does not depend on whether the
information is in electronic or physical form, but rather on whether or not the
person has exposed it to another or the public in general. 61 Amendment Nine
wrongly assumes that electronic data and communications were not previously
protected. More specifically, it assumes that differences in protection can be
remedied by the inclusion of the terms “electronic data” and “electronic
communications” in the list of constitutionally protected areas. This
assumption ignores the fact that the difference in protection stems largely from
the workings of the third party rule and not from whether the information is in
electronic form.
III. MISSOURI LAW PRIOR TO AMENDMENT NINE
A.

Missouri Constitution Article I, Section 15 offers protections that are
“coextensive” with Fourth Amendment protections

The Fourth Amendment provides a floor. 62 States can offer greater
protections, but cannot cut into or decrease the Fourth Amendment right. 63
States vary in how they treat their own constitutional protections as compared
to the Fourth Amendment protection. 64 The variation is perhaps best treated as
a continuum: at one extreme are states that treat their constitutional protection
as remaining coequal and in lockstep with federal Fourth Amendment

60. See infra Part V.A; In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Elec.
Commc’n Serv. to Disclose Records to Gov’t, 620 F.3d 304, 317 (3d Cir. 2010) [hereinafter
Third Circuit CSLI Case].
61. E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1969) (holding that seizure of
narcotics from a third party did not violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976) (holding that under the third party doctrine, the
Fourth Amendment did not prohibit seizure of defendant’s cancelled checks, deposit slips, and
microfilm duplicates from the banks, but detailing some statutory protection).
62. See Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI; see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655
(1961) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by implementation of the exclusionary rule); Irma
S. Raker, Fourth Amendment and Independent State Grounds, 77 MISS. L.J. 401, 401 (2007).
63. The Constitution of Michigan, for example, has in addition to a nearly identically
worded analog of the Fourth Amendment this sentence: “The provisions of this section shall not
be construed to bar from evidence in any criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm, bomb,
explosive or any other dangerous weapon, seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of any
dwelling house in this state.” MICH. CONST. art. I, § 11. The Sixth Circuit held this provision to
be in conflict with the Fourth Amendment and therefore invalid. Lucas v. Michigan, 420 F.2d
259, 263 (6th Cir. 1970).
64. See generally Henderson, supra note 27; Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and
Seizure Analogs, 77 MISS. L.J. 417 (2007).
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jurisprudence. 65 Interpretation of the state constitutional protection changes in
exact synchrony or “lockstep” with changes in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. 66 At the other extreme are states that explicitly afford greater
protections above and beyond the Fourth Amendment floor. 67 In between are
states in “limited lockstep” who recognize the right to treat their constitutions
as affording greater protections, but who have employed that right in only
extremely limited circumstances if at all. 68 There is not always a correlation
between having virtually identical wording in the state’s Fourth Amendment
analog and viewing the protection as the same. 69
Missouri is solidly at the first end of the spectrum. Missouri courts have
long held that Article I, Section 15 rights are “coextensive” with Fourth
Amendment rights, and that “the same analysis applies.” 70 Missouri has never
found a greater protection in the state constitution than in the Fourth
Amendment. Missouri is certainly free to break its long history and amend its
constitution in a way that provides greater privacy protections than offered in
the Fourth Amendment, 71 but will Amendment Nine have that effect? Indeed,
Missouri courts have continued to recite the “coextensive” and “the same
analysis applies” mantra even in decisions issued after the passage of
Amendment Nine, however most of these cases did not involve electronic data
and communications. 72 The Western District has explicitly addressed the issue

65. E.g., People v. Caballes, 851 N.E.2d 26, 41 (Ill. 2006) (describing and reviewing the
literature on the “lockstep” doctrine).
66. Id.
67. E.g., Washington’s constitution offers greater protections. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7;
Gorman, supra note 64, at 461–62.
68. E.g., North Dakota’s Fourth Amendment analog has been interpreted to allow the state to
offer greater protections, but the state has not done so. Gorman, supra note 64, at 448.
69. E.g., Indiana’s analog is virtually identical to the Fourth Amendment, yet the courts have
held that the analysis is not the same, and that the state offers greater protections. Jon Laramore &
Daniel E. Pulliam, Indiana Constitutional Developments: Small Steps, 47 IND. L. REV. 1015,
1029 (2014); McIlquham v. State, 10 N.E.3d 506, 511 (Ind. 2014) (“Our State constitutional
provision, ‘although almost identical in text to its federal counterpart, nevertheless requires a
different analysis. . . .’”).
70. E.g., State v. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Mo. 1996); State v. Lovelady, 432 S.W.3d
187, 190 (Mo. 2014).
71. Rushing, 935 S.W.2d at 34.
72. Most of these cases explicitly recited that the federal and state constitutional protections
are “coextensive” and that the “same analysis applies.” E.g., State v. Walker, 460 S.W.3d 81, 85
(Mo. Ct. App. 2015). Some of them made no mention of the Missouri constitutional provision at
all, but conducted the review based solely on the Fourth Amendment. E.g., State v. Spires, ED
101279, 2014 WL 5839734, at *2 (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 2014). Fewer recited that both
constitutional provisions are involved, and while not explicitly saying how the two are related
implying the analysis is the same by conducting only one analysis. E.g., State v. Nunez, 455
S.W.3d 529, 531 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
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and held that even with Amendment Nine’s added language, the Missouri
Constitution offers no greater protections than the Fourth Amendment. 73
B.

Missouri case law prior to Amendment Nine already recognized
protection for electronic data and communications and already
recognized and limited the third party rule

Missouri already recognized protection in “first party” searches of
electronic data. 74 That is, if the person does not voluntarily give the data to a
third party, there is no doubt that the contents of cell phones, computers, digital
cameras, storage media, etc. were already protected to the same degree as
“persons, homes, papers, and effects.”
In State v. Oliver, for example, police officers seized the defendant’s
computer, computer data storage disks, digital camera, and camera data card
based on the defendant’s wife’s consent following the defendant’s refusal to
give consent to the search of his home office. 75 Two weeks later, police
searched the electronically stored contents of these items under a search
warrant. 76 The court held that even if the wife’s consent was invalid, the
evidence found from searching the contents of these items was admissible
either due to the inevitable discovery doctrine or because the bad seizure did
not invalidate the search warrant. 77 All of this reasoning is based on the
presumption that the electronic data stored on these devices is protected to the
same degree by pre-Amendment Nine Article I, Section 15 and the Fourth
Amendment. That is, the police either needed valid consent or an exception to
the warrant requirement to search the electronically stored data on these items.
In State v. Sachs, the court held that the police officer’s act of merely
clicking an icon to bring to view a currently running but minimized application
on a desktop computer lawfully seized by police was a search under the Fourth
Amendment and the Missouri Constitution. 78 In Sachs, the police officer
lawfully seized the defendant’s then-running desktop computer in the

73. State ex rel Koster v. Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 461 S.W.3d 851, 857–58 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015) (“Because the Fourth Amendment is already being interpreted to protect electronic
communications and data, we conclude that article I, section 15, even as amended, is not currently
measurably more restrictive on the government than is the Fourth Amendment.”).
74. See State v. Oliver, 293 S.W.3d 437, 443 (Mo. 2009).
75. Id. at 440.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 442, 443–44 (“The officers did not obtain a warrant to search the office and seize
the items; rather, the detective conducted the search and seizure based on Oliver’s wife’s consent.
The validity of this consent does not affect the admissibility of the items because had the
detective not relied on the consent, he would have discovered this evidence pursuant to a search
warrant. . . . The initial seizure did not affect the validity of the warrant obtained to search these
items.”).
78. State v. Sachs, 372 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
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defendant’s home. 79 The screen showed a running word processor program,
but the officer could see the minimized icon indicating that other applications
were running, including what he recognized as a bit-torrent client
application. 80 The defendant refused to consent to a search of the contents of
the computer, and the officer clicked on the icon without waiting for a search
warrant. 81 The court, relying on a Ninth Circuit case that held that merely
moving the mouse to “wake up” a computer screen was a search, ruled that the
officer’s actions constituted a search under Missouri and federal constitutional
law. 82 Again, the reasoning in Sachs depends on the idea that the electronic
data on the computer is subject to the same Fourth Amendment protections as
“persons, homes, papers, and effects” even before Missouri added “electronic
data” to the list.
Furthermore, the “coextensive” treatment applies to “electronic
communications” as well. Missouri is bound by Katz, which is a case that
clearly recognized Fourth Amendment protections for electronic telephone
communications. 83
In State v. Clampitt, Missouri recognized the third party doctrine and
limited its application to “outside” or non-content information. 84 This case
involved the collection of data from the defendant’s cell phone carrier to use as
evidence that would place the defendant at the location of a motor vehicle
accident. 85 The court held that text messages stored on the defendant’s cell
phone were protected, even though the messages were also accessible by the
phone service provider. 86 This holding echoes what Riley said about data
stored on the cloud but accessible on the phone, but deals with a fact set
involving law enforcement’s attempt to obtain that information from the thirdparty phone service provider. The Clampitt court recognized the third party
rule from Smith v. Maryland, but based its reasoning in limiting that rule
largely on a Sixth Circuit case, United States v. Warshak. 87 Warshak
recognized protection for the content of e-mails accessible or in the possession
of an Internet Service Provider (ISP). 88 Warshak makes clearer the distinction
between what we hand over to a third party recipient and a third party carrier,
79. Id. at 59.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 60.
82. Id. at 61, 63.
83. E.g., State v. Bates, 344 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (applying the two-part
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test); see supra text accompanying note 43 (observing
Katz protects electronic communications).
84. State v. Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d 605, 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).
85. Id. at 607–08. To clarify, this information was text message content providing location,
not cell tower information or CSLI.
86. Id. at 611.
87. Id. at 610–11.
88. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
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or what it refers to as an “intermediary.” 89 The Sixth Circuit analogizes e-mail
to traditional mail that passes through the hands of a number of letter carriers
after we entrust it to the Post Office. 90 The Missouri court adopted this
reasoning to hold that the content of text messages were analogous to the
content of e-mail, which Warshak found analogous to the contents or insides of
a letter, and thus the third party rule was not applicable. 91
IV. ELECTRONIC DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
VANISHING “CIRCUIT SPLIT” IN APPLYING THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE TO CSLI
CASES
A.

The technology in CSLI collection

As we will see, the facts in these CSLI cases vary somewhat, but what they
all have in common is that law enforcement obtained data from the cell phone
service provider that includes information allowing them to determine—to a
greater or lesser degree of precision 92—the location of the cell phone and
therefore the person carrying the cell phone. 93 These cases rely on the fact that
in order for the company to provide cell phone services, the phone must carry
on two-way communication with nearby “base stations” also known as “cell
towers.” 94 Most cell towers have several antennae (or “cell sectors” or “cell
sites”) oriented in different directions. 95 Towers provide connectivity within a

89. Id. at 285.
90. Id. Professor Kerr would approve of this sort of analogy because analogizing between
electronic data and communications and physical things helps make rules that are “technology
neutral.” Kerr, supra note 53, at 1007.
91. Clampitt, 364 S.W.3d at 611.
92. On the one hand are those who argue that it only provides crude location primarily due
to the often wrong assumption that the tower with which the phone establishes a connection is the
nearest. If the nearest tower has a high volume of traffic, the phone will connect to the next
nearest, and so on. It is possible to connect to a tower as far as twenty miles away. Douglas Starr,
What Your Cell Phone Can’t Tell Police, THE NEW YORKER, June 26, 2014, http://www.new
yorker.com/news/news-desk/what-your-cell-phone-cant-tell-the-police [http://perma.cc/38R7-83
ZT]. On the other hand, an expert gave testimony at Congressional hearings that although
location precision varies, it can provide “locational precision similar to that of GPS.” ECPA
Reform and the Revolution in Location Based Technologies and Services: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 81–85, 93–94 (2010), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg570
82/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg57082.pdf [http://perma.cc/7ZWA-Y7SW].
93. For a nice summary of how the technology works, see In re Application for Tel. Info.
Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 15XR90304HRL1LHK, 2015 WL 4594558, at *1–3 (N.D.
Cal. July 29, 2015) [hereinafter N.D. Cal. CSLI Case].
94. Id. at *1.
95. Id.
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“cell,” the hexagonal area covered by that tower. 96 The CSLI can be generated
and recorded when the user places a call or sends or receives a text message or
other communications. 97 In others, it is the result of a “ping” either initiated by
the phone service provider (that is, sent out from the tower 98) or initiated by
the phone itself. 99 For example, whenever a user first turns on a cell phone, the
phone pings nearby towers in order to establish a connection with the nearest
available tower and look for missed calls and text messages, update the date
and time settings, and conduct any other automatic communications. 100 An
example of such an automatic communication is an app running continuously
in the background that alerts the user of sports scores, weather information,
and so on. 101 When the cell phone is moving, as when the user is driving down
the highway, it will periodically ping towers in order to maintain the best
possible connection. 102 In high traffic areas, such as urban centers, effective
cells are generally very small and CSLI is more precise. 103 Finally, whenever
the user places or receives a call or message in real time, the phone
communicates with the tower, and the service provider obtains and records the
“outside” or “non-content” information it needs to provide the service. 104 It

96. See Robert D. Keith, How Cell Phones Work, INTERACTIVE MEDIA LAB, U. OF FLA.,
http://iml.jou.ufl.edu/projects/fall04/keith/Works.htm
[http://perma.cc/F5GT-KHWG]
(last
visited Mar. 28, 2015); See, e.g., United States v. Caraballo, 963 F. Supp. 2d 341, 347–48 (D. Vt.
2013); Marshall Brain et al., How Cell Phones Work, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://electronics.how
stuffworks.com/cell-phone1.htm [http://perma.cc/U9QF-QJQZ] (last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
97. N.D. Cal. CSLI Case, 2015 WL 4594558, at *1.
98. Id. at *2 (“Pinging is automatic and occurs whenever the phone is on, without the user’s
input or control.”) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Lesson Plan: How Cell Phones Work 9
(2010), http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/3259_how_cell_phones_work_lp.pdf [http://perma.cc/
D6HJ-M9SL]); e.g., State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 890 n.4 (Mo. 2015), reh’g denied (Mar. 31,
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 37 (2015).
99. N.D. Cal. CSLI Case, 2015 WL 4594558, at *2.
100. See id.; Keith, supra note 96; Marshall Brain et al., How Cell Phones Work, HOW STUFF
WORKS, http://electronics.howstuffworks.com/cell-phone3.htm [http://perma.cc/6HKD-T7RL]
(last visited Mar. 28, 2015).
101. iPhone 3g Commercial “There’s an App for That 2009,” YOUTUBE (Feb. 4, 2009),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=szrsfeyLzyg [http://perma.cc/3X68-26NW].
102. N.D. Cal. CSLI Case, 2015 WL 4594558, at *2 (“[C]ell phones periodically identify
themselves to the closest cell tower—i.e., the one with the strongest radio signal—as they move
throughout their network’s coverage area.”).
103. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 542 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479
(2015) (“As a person walks around town, particularly a dense, urban environment, her cell phone
continuously and without notice to her connects with towers, antennas, microcells, and femtocells
that reveal her location information with differing levels of precision—to the nearest mile, or the
nearest block, or the nearest foot.”).
104. Orin Kerr, Eleventh Circuit Rules for the Feds on Cell-Site Records—But Then
Overreaches, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 5, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/05/05/eleventh-circuit-rules-for-the-feds-on-cell-siterecords-but-then-overreaches/ [http://perma.cc/5D72-48K5] (“Cell tower location records do not
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acts as an intermediary or carrier to “inside” or “content” information
transmitted to others.
In some of these cases, law enforcement sought historic data: the stored
records of past calls, usually to “place” a suspect near the scene of the crime;
in others, law enforcement obtained the information prospectively, essentially
tracking the movement of the cell phone in real time. 105 Also, some of the
cases are reviews of orders granted under the Stored Communications Act, and
some are challenges to the refusal of a magistrate to grant the order, or
challenges to the authority of the magistrate to grant such an order before it has
been issued. 106
Generally, CSLI locates the cell phone because the location of the tower is
known, and any phone that communicates with a particular tower must be
within that tower’s cell—that is, it must be near enough to connect. Therefore,
location is within the cell size. CSLI can include data as to which direction
from the cell tower the phone was, based on which directionally-oriented
antenna on the tower was used. 107
Some cell phone service providers also use and record another type of
location information: Per Call Measurement Data (PCMD).108 PCMD relies on
a measure of the time it takes a signal to travel between the phone and the
tower to calculate the distance between the two. 109 PCMD is created and
recorded for calls, text messages, and other data transmissions. 110 PCMD was
originally generated and recorded to help service providers track dropped calls
and reposition tower antennae to minimize signal loss. 111 Not all carriers
generate and record this information, and those that do only preserve it for a
week or two. 112 PCMD can provide better evidence of a cell phone’s location,

contain private communications of the subscriber. This type of non-content evidence, lawfully
created by a third-party telephone company for legitimate business purposes, does not belong to
Davis, even if it concerns him.”).
105. See infra Part IV.D.
106. These procedural distinctions are not relevant to this analysis, so will be treated
cursorily.
107. N.D. Cal. CSLI Case, 2015 WL 4594558, at *1 (describing a typical tower with three
antennae oriented such that each antennae covers an area within the cell swept out by a 120degree arc).
108. AARON EDENS, CELL PHONE INVESTIGATIONS™: NARCOTICS OPERATIONS 17 (2012),
http://policetechnical.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Cell-Phone-Conference-Narcotics.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q8XC-9PUD].
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 18–19; Senior Member, Per Call Measurement Data, FORENSIC FOCUS: FOR
DIGITAL AND EDISCOVERY PROFS. (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.forensicfocus.com/Forums/view
topic/t=7122/ [http://perma.cc/LP27-FSTN].
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but still not as accurate as GPS. 113 PCMD may be treated as distinct from
CSLI. 114
B.

Why CSLI?

In examining the effectiveness of Amendment Nine, it is necessary to see
what kind of current controversies the state faces before determining whether
Amendment Nine will help Missouri in any way. The terms “electronic data”
and “electronic communications” encompass all sorts of technologies that
might involve government collection of information, especially from third
parties. Furthermore, the intention was surely broader than the technical
meaning of these terms. 115 So why choose CSLI as a test for the effectiveness
of Amendment Nine?
Since any good third party rule should be technology-neutral, 116 cases
involving any of these technologies should yield the same result. Even though
the choice is therefore ultimately arbitrary, a quick look at the other likely
candidates shows that CSLI is best for in-depth testing of the effect of
Amendment Nine because it is the hottest topic (in terms of having the most
federal appellate level opinions) that the Missouri Constitution could likely
reach.

113. EDENS, supra note 108, at 17–18.
114. State v. Ford, 454 S.W.3d 407, 410–11 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015) (“PCMD was different from
the cell tower data, because it measured the radio frequency distance between the telephone and
nearby towers, and gave an estimate of the location of the telephone itself during the call.”).
115. Strictly speaking, data on CDs and DVDs is stored optically, not electronically. See, e.g.,
Jeff Tyson, How Removable Storage Works: Optical Storage, HOW STUFF WORKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/removable-storage7.html [http://perma.cc/Q5JQ-TJJU] (last
visited Dec. 18, 2015); Inst. for Local Self-Reliance, Fiberoptic Networks, COMMUNITY
BROADBAND NETWORKS, http://muninetworks.org/content/fiber-optic-network [http://perma.cc/
CKR8-ZKD5] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). Most familiar “electronic” storage media are magnetic
media, though physically magnetism and electricity are interrelated. Jeff Tyson, How Removable
Storage Works: Magnetic Storage, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://computer.howstuffworks.com/re
movable-storage2.htm [http://perma.cc/Y9BQ-8PFY] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015); Electricity and
Magnetism, RON KURTUS’ SCH. FOR CHAMPIONS, http://www.school-for-champions.com/elec
tricity.htm [http://perma.cc/GXY2-PDDZ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). Development of
biological storage media is underway. Sebastian Anthony, Harvard Cracks DNA Storage, Crams
700 Terabytes of Data Into a Single Gram, EXTREMETECH (Aug. 17, 2012), http://www.extreme
tech.com/extreme/134672-harvard-cracks-dna-storage-crams-700-terabytes-of-data-into-a-singlegram [http://perma.cc/MT5N-Q277]; see also W. DANIEL HILLIS, THE PATTERN ON THE STONE:
THE SIMPLE IDEAS THAT MAKE COMPUTERS WORK, at VIII (1998) (explaining that data storage
and manipulation—computers—”transcend[] technology” and could even be made with “valves
and water pipes, or from sticks and strings”).
116. Kerr, supra note 53, at 1007.
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Global Positioning System (GPS) and Other Electronic Tracking

A GPS device receives signals from government-owned satellites. 117 These
satellites broadcast their ephemerides (information about the satellite’s location
in the sky at any moment) along with a precise time stamp. 118 The receiving
device uses this information to calculate by trilateration its position on the
Earth’s surface converted by the device to traditional latitude and longitude
coordinates. 119 To be used as a tracker, a GPS device must either store or, as in
the Jones case, transmit that location data to law enforcement. 120
In Knotts, police used a simple radio beeper as a tracking device. 121 This
gadget simply broadcasts a radio signal that helps police follow the suspect’s
vehicle from a greater distance and with less risk of losing the suspect than a
conventional police “tail.” 122 The familiar holding from Knotts is that a person
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements on public
roadways. 123
In Jones, police used a GPS tracking device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements over nearly a one-month period. 124 Jones argued a version of the
Mosaic Theory, but the majority decision of the Court disposed of the issue
based on the trespass rule: when police trespass on one of areas enumerated in
the Fourth Amendment for the purpose of collecting information, they violate
the Fourth Amendment. 125 Some of the concurring opinions accepted a “long
term Katz” test or Mosaic rule. 126

117. The Global Positioning System: What Is GPS?, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/systems/
gps/ [http://perma.cc/QTH9-2KG2] (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
118. GPS Signals, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GPS_signals [http://perma.cc/6Z
BS-W6HL] (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
119. Trilateration Exercise, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/multimedia/tutorials/trilateration/
[http://perma.cc/8D73-YSFV] (last visited Mar. 23, 2015); Global Positioning System,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_Positioning_System#Fundamentals [http://per
ma.cc/AS65-JRC9] (last visited Mar. 23, 2015).
120. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (“By means of signals from
multiple satellites, the device established the vehicle’s location within 50 to 100 feet, and
communicated that location by cellular phone to a Government computer.”); Chris Hoffman,
HTG Explains How GPS Actually Works, HOW-TO GEEK (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.howto
geek.com/137862/htg-explains-how-gps-actually-works/ [http://perma.cc/4TES-K9UB] (“GPS
tracking devices don’t just use GPS receivers—they store the GPS data for later retrieval or
transmit the GPS data.”).
121. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277 (1983).
122. Id. at 278–79.
123. Id. at 281 (“A person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”).
124. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 946.
125. Orin Kerr, Does Fourth Amendment Standing Work Differently for Jones Trespass
Searches, Traditional Katz Searches, and Long-Term Katz Searches?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(Feb. 14, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/02/14/does-fourth-amendment-standing-work-different
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Most smartphones are also GPS devices. 127 Other data, such as street maps
and navigation apps are provided by other service providers. 128 This GPS
location information is not required by the phone company to provide its
services. 129 The phone company, in providing cell phone service, does not
normally receive and store GPS data. The phone company acting as an
intermediary might transmit that data to other service providers (for use in a
street navigation app, for example). The phone can function as a GPS device
even without communicating to any cell phone towers. 130 I would distinguish
GPS data from CSLI by characterizing the GPS data as “content” or “inside”
data that is not voluntarily given to the cell phone service provider. In this way
it is the same as the content of a phone conversation, and should be protected
by the Fourth Amendment.
Most dedicated GPS devices, like Garmins or TomToms, are strictly
receivers and not transmitters. 131 Other tracking devices, such as LoJack,
involve voluntarily conveying the information to law enforcement; in other
words, the service provided is turning the information over to police. 132
Even this cursory look at GPS and other trackers indicates that
Amendment Nine will be no help.
2.

Remote Data Storage

This category includes explicit third party storage services such as
Microsoft Cloud, Google Drive, DropBox, and IMAP e-mail (Internet Mail
Access Protocol, that is web based e-mail). 133 What these have in common is

ly-for-jones-trespass-searches-traditional-katz-searches-and-katz-long-term-expectation-of-pri
vacy-searches/ [http://perma.cc/8JYX-D6QB].
126. Id.; e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[T]he use of longer term
GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”).
127. See Eric A. Taub, What Stand-Alone GPS Devices Do That Smartphones Can’t, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2015, at B7, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/16/technology/personaltech/whatstand-alone-gps-devices-do-that-smartphones-cant.html [http://nyti.ms/1Hvwt6C].
128. See, e.g., Latest Navigation, ANDROID FREEWARE, http://www.androidfreeware.net/tagnavigation.html [http://perma.cc/3CX5-KYDT] (last visited Aug. 23, 2015) (listing several free
service providers and app download links for android devices).
129. That is, you can disable the GPS feature on a cell phone and the device will still function
as a cell phone, including data services other than GPS. E.g., How to Turn Off GPS on the
iPhone, WIKIHOW, http://www.wikihow.com/Turn-off-GPS-on-the-iPhone [http://perma.cc/68
E3-EBY5] (last visited Dec. 14, 2015).
130. Christopher Null, We Tested 4 GPS Apps That Work Even When You’re Offline, WIRED
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/offline-gps-apps/ [http://perma.cc/5U2B-9QE7].
131. Hoffman, supra note 120 (“GPS on its own isn’t a privacy concern—for example, if you
have an old GPS unit for your car, it likely isn’t capable of transmitting your location.”).
132. How LoJack Works, http://www.lojack.com/Cars,-Trucks-And-Classics/How-LoJackWorks [http://perma.cc/4K8X-ZX3H] (last visited Dec. 15, 2015).
133. See Joe Kissell, Backup Basics: The Quick Something-Is-Better-Than-Nothing Backup
System, MACWORLD (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.macworld.com/article/2013004/backup-basics-
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that data is stored either exclusively in third party storage accessible by a user
interface on a local device, or simultaneously in both locations. The third party
doctrine would apply to “content” or “inside” data, but not to outside or noncontent. 134 This is the equivalent of putting effects in a self-storage locker. The
fact that you used a storage locker (the terms of your contract with the selfstorage company which might include the rental period, the size of the locker,
etc.) is non-content or outside information, analogous to the exterior of an
envelope or parcel sent via the mail, and therefore should be accessible to
police without implicating the Fourth Amendment. The distinction between
content and non-content might not be so clear-cut because some typically noncontent information might convey content. 135 In my self-storage analogy, that
would be like sizes of boxes and individual labels on those boxes inside a
storage locker. I would argue that police can only get the overall outside
data—nothing they would have to open the locker to obtain. In cloud storage,
that means only that the user has an account and what the overall storage size
available to you is. If they start looking at file names, types, and sizes, they
have opened the locker door and started looking at characteristics of the
contents, even if they have yet to open any sealed boxes.
In Riley, the Supreme Court treated in dicta a different question, the
problem of data accessible via a local device that is stored remotely. 136 The
Court said that viewing remote data on the device would be “like finding a key
in a suspect’s pocket and arguing that it allowed law enforcement to unlock

the-quick-something-is-better-than-nothing-backup-system.html [http://perma.cc/9QWC-ACBT];
Sanebox, Inc., The Differences Between POP and IMAP, POP2IMAP, http://www.pop2imap.
com/ [http://perma.cc/ZJD8-GVVA] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
134. Kerr, supra note 53; Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act,
and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004) (“Several
courts have applied this rationale and held that an Internet user does not retain a reasonable
expectation of privacy in noncontent information disclosed to an ISP.”). But see United States v.
Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 283 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that the SCA allows the government to obtain
e-mail content that has been left on the e-mail server more than 180 days without a warrant). This
Warshak holding might have to do with a theory that something abandoned has been exposed,
possibly the basis of the rule regarding searching an opaque trash container left on the curb for
trash collection. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55 (1988) (finding a distinction
between trash in an opaque container for trash pickup and a package or envelope left for mail
pickup in holding that there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of the latter but
not the former).
135. Matthew J. Tokson, The Content/Envelope Distinction in Internet Law, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2105, 2123–44, 2150, 2167 (2009) (noting that file names, e-mail and file size, e-mail
headers, etc. might reveal content); United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045, 1049 (9th Cir. 2010)
(finding in the context of a plain view argument under Hicks that visible file names made evident
that the files were probably illegal child pornography image files) (applying Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321, 324–26 (1987) (holding that the doctrine requires the illicit nature of the thing
seized to be apparent by sight without further manipulation)).
136. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2491 (2014).
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and search a house.” 137 This implies that the reverse is also a search under the
Fourth Amendment: that is, if police are not permitted to search the device
without a warrant, the fact that the same content is also stored remotely (in the
possession of a third party) does not obviate the need for a warrant. This rule
makes sense because this data is “content” (i.e. not information voluntarily
conveyed to the third party) and would not be available without a warrant even
from the third party. Therefore, nothing about the third party doctrine would
change the principal holding in Riley that police may not obtain the contents of
a cell phone in a search incident to arrest without a warrant except in
vanishingly rare exigent circumstances. 138
Again, Amendment Nine will not help resolve any controversies in this
category.
3.

Wi-Fi Location Information

Mobile devices that have Wi-Fi capability can also calculate their position
based on information about Wi-Fi access points. 139 It is used as an alternative
to GPS, for example, in some Kindle Fire models. 140 A federal district court
examined this location method along with the other “geolocation” methods
(notably GPS and CSLI) for calculating the location of a mobile device. 141
Like GPS, this data is calculated by an app on the local device and can be
shared with third party app service providers. 142 Unlike CSLI, it is not

137. Id.
138. Id. at 2485, 2494 (holding that such vanishingly rare circumstances as “a suspect texting
an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may
have information about the child’s location on his cell phone” were absent in the case at bar and
that otherwise digital content did not comprise exigent circumstances).
139. Fred Zahradnik, Wi-Fi Positioning System, ABOUT TECH (Dec. 4, 2014), http://gps.
about.com/od/glossary/g/wifi_position.htm [http://perma.cc/YZ39-VL2B]. A recent case in
federal district court dealt with patent infringement claims on the various technologies involved
in calculating location this way. Skyhook Wireless, Inc. v. Google, Inc., CIV.A. 10-11571-RWZ,
2014 WL 898595, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 6, 2014). Mozilla Location services blends CSLI and WiFi location technologies. Overview, MOZILLA LOCATION SERVS., http://location.services.mozilla.
com/ [http://perma.cc/C9BG-MLR5] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
140. Device and Feature Specifications, AMAZON, http://developer.amazon.com/appsandserv
ices/solutions/devices/kindle-fire/specifications/01-device-and-feature-specifications [http://per
ma.cc/88HC-TW6Z] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
141. In re Smartphone Geolocation Data Application, 977 F. Supp. 2d 129, 137 (E.D.N.Y.
2013).
142. Location Services FAQ, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.
html/ref=hp_terms_us?nodeId=201604200 [http://perma.cc/XR5P-JUUG] (last visited Dec. 18,
2015). Since Amazon can also collect and use this data for providing services to Kindle users,
while other times it merely relays the data to other service providers, Amazon is sometimes a
third party carrier/intermediary and sometimes a third party recipient. See id. Also note that
Kindles equipped with 4G (cell phone) connectivity can also use CSLI to calculate their position.
Id.
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information normally calculated and stored by the phone company to provide
its services. Furthermore, like GPS but not CSLI, Wi-Fi location services can
be disabled by the user, and stored data can be deleted by the user. 143 Owners
of Wi-Fi access points can also disable location information being collected by
Google for Wi-Fi location purposes. 144 I would argue that Wi-Fi location
information falls under the same category as GPS data when transmitted via
the phone company to another recipient. That is, it should count as content,
especially since it can be disabled without destroying the functionality of the
device, and thus not something voluntarily given to the third party
carrier/intermediary (the phone company). The dearth of Fourth Amendment
cases involving this technology is probably due to the fact that use of these
devices is not as ubiquitous as is the use of cell phones.
4.

Data Conveyed to an Internet Service Provider (ISP)

When a user enters a web address into a web browser, is that information
analogous to the numbers dialed on a telephone in Smith v. Maryland? If so,
then most of the litigation in this area will happen under the statutory
protections rather than the Fourth Amendment. 145 But there is still controversy
over that point. 146 I suspect there is less litigation on this point because law
enforcement normally seeks a warrant (or its equivalent, supported by probable
cause) for information sought from ISPs since at least much of the information
of interest will be content. At any rate, clearly Amendment Nine will offer no
help in making the critical distinction in making the third party doctrine
analysis in these cases.
5.

National Security Agency (NSA) Collection of Phone Call Metadata

Since Edward Snowden leaked the existence of a widespread NSA
program collecting cell phone call metadata, this category has been a hot
topic. 147 At any rate, this is not a good test for Missouri’s Amendment Nine
143. E.g., id. (instructing Kindle Fire users how to disable Wi-Fi location services and how to
delete location history). The fact that Kindle Fire users with Wi-Fi location services can disable
location services, argues that it is not information Amazon must collect and store in order to
provide services (in this case, the service is allowing the user to purchase and display e-books,
audiobooks, movies, games, and so on).
144. Zahradnik, supra note 139 (“Simply add ‘_nomap’ to the name of the Wi-Fi network,
and Google will not map it.”).
145. E.g., In re Zynga Privacy Litig., 750 F.3d 1098, 1108–09 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that
since such information “does not constitute the contents of a communication,” distinctions needed
to resolve the case fell entirely under the E.C.P.A.).
146. Tokson, supra note 135, at 2167; United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510 n.6 (9th
Cir. 2008) (observing in dicta that URLs might be content for Fourth Amendment purposes).
147. E.g., Charlie Savage, Judge Deals a Blow to N.S.A. Data Collection Program, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2015, at A17, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/10/us/politics/judge-deals-a-blow
-to-nsa-phone-surveillance-program.html [http://perma.cc/33SB-8F5T]; Klayman v. Obama, CV
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since the Missouri Constitution will likely not find any application to NSA
practices. 148
6.

Cell Site Emulators (“Triggerfish” and “Stingray”)

This category refers to devices made by the Harris Corporation used by
law enforcement to spoof a cell tower in order to obtain the location and
identity of cell phones. 149 The existence and use of these devices by law
enforcement had been classified. 150 In fact, the secrecy meant law enforcement
was unable to bring evidence gathered this way to trial, bargaining down
charges 151 and even dismissing charges altogether 152 rather than subjecting the
technology to court scrutiny. Therefore, there are few cases to look at in this
category.
I would argue that the third party doctrine applies, and the key distinctions
have to be between content and non-content data. It seems strange to put this
under third party doctrine since the device allows police to intercept radio
waves directly from the cell phones and not rely on cell phone company
records. However, the frequencies used for cell phones are exclusive use

13-851 (RJL), 2015 WL 6873127, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2015); Obama v. Klayman, 800 F.3d
559, 561 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
148. Despite allegations that the NSA is sharing this data with state and local law
enforcement for use in criminal prosecutions, Michael Maharrey, Surprise: NSA Apologist
Opposes Missouri Amendment 9 Ballot Measure, OFFNOW (July 1, 2014), http://offnow.org/sur
prise-nsa-apologist-opposes-missouri-amendment-9-ballot-measure/ [http://perma.cc/8TXJ-NV
ZX] (“We know that the NSA expressly shares warrantless data with state and local law
enforcement through a super-secret DEA unit known as the Special Operations Division (SOD).
We know that state prosecutors use the information in criminal cases.”), I have found no Missouri
or other state cases where prosecution attempted to use such data as evidence. On the contrary, in
a recent Missouri case, the defendant hoped to use CSLI to prove his alibi defense, but the phone
company had already destroyed the data. The defendant tried, apparently without success, to get
the NSA metadata under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request. State v. Moore, 469
S.W.3d 512, 514–15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
149. Jennifer Valentino-Devries, “Stingray” Phone Tracker Fuels Constitutional Clash,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904194604576583
112723197574 [http://perma.cc/L2NQ-CPPF]; EDENS, supra note 108, at 20.
150. EDENS, supra note 108, at 20. These devices were the subject of a Freedom of
Information Act Lawsuit. Am. Civil Liberties Union of N. Cal. v. Dep’t of Justice, 70 F. Supp. 3d
1018, 1022–23 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
151. Ellen Nakashima, Secrecy Around Police Surveillance Equipment Proves a Case’s
Undoing, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
secrecy-around-police-surveillance-equipment-proves-a-cases-undoing/2015/02/22/ce72308ab7ac-11e4-aa05-1ce812b3fdd2_story.html [http://perma.cc/F9SY-PMYN].
152. Robert Patrick, Controversial Secret Phone Tracker Figured in Dropped St. Louis Case,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 19, 2015, at A1, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/controversial-secret-phone-tracker-figured-in-dropped-st-louis-case/article_fbb82630-aa7f5200-b221-a7f90252b2d0.html [http://perma.cc/SRL3-6W3H].
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licenses. 153 By contrast, Citizen’s Band (CB) radio frequencies are “licensed
by rule” meaning that anyone who owns a transceiver can use the
frequencies. 154 Although the frequencies used by cell phones are still public
airwaves, the phone companies paid the government for the right to exclusive
use of certain frequencies in certain geographic areas. 155 Therefore, radio
waves sent from a cell phone to a tower are in the possession of the cell phone
company the instant they leave the phone. While there may be further statutory
limitations on how police can use these devices, the Fourth Amendment
analysis should only depend on whether they are gathering content or noncontent information.
At the time of this writing, because the technology was kept secret, there
are few cases involving cell tower emulators. At any rate, it is plain that
Amendment Nine will provide no help in resolving this key area of
controversy.
7.

Miscellaneous

Other types of data storage and communications that implicate Fourth
Amendment concerns are nearly endless: Radio Frequency Identity (RFID)
chips, removable media drives, etc. In a case out of New Mexico, the Tenth
Circuit faced the question of whether police officers reading data off magnetic
strips on credit cards without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. 156

153. What Is Licensed Spectrum?, SELECT SPECTRUM, http://selectspectrum.com/Spec
trum.html [http://perma.cc/Q4QY-8Q86] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (“Commercial operators
including . . . mobile phone companies . . . acquire protection from interference in the form of
FCC spectrum licenses which provide for exclusive use and protection from interference in
specific areas.”); Kimberly M. Randolph, Spectrum Licenses: Valuation Intricacies, STOUT,
RISIUS, ROSS GLOBAL FIN. ADVISORY SERVS., http://www.srr.com/article/spectrum-licensesvaluation-intricacies [http://perma.cc/3RM6-QPYQ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (“Examples of
exclusive use licenses include cellular mobile . . . “).
154. Citizens Band (CB) Service, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/general/citizens-band-cbservice [http://perma.cc/G4A4-R3PQ] (last visited Dec. 18, 2015) (“The CB Service is licensed
by rule.”); 47 C.F.R. § 95.404 (2009) (specifying no individual license is required to use CB).
155. Cellular Service, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov/general/cellular-service [http://perma.
cc/V3JL-4BHH] (last visited June 14, 2015); Accessing Spectrum, FCC.GOV, http://www.fcc.gov
/general/accessing-spectrum [http://perma.cc/TG3C-2ZCX] (last visited June 14, 2015)
(describing exclusive licensing in geographic areas for commercial use); David McCabe, Five
Biggest FCC Stories of 2015, THE HILL (Dec. 20, 2015), http://thehill.com/policy/tech
nology/263788-five-biggest-fcc-stories-of-2015 [http://perma.cc/EN3K-KUPL] (describing plans
by the FCC to buy back spectrum from broadcasters and auction it to cell phone providers); Alan
Holmes, Wireless Companies Fight for Their Futures, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Mar. 21,
2014), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2014/03/21/14433/wireless-companies-fight-their-futures
[http://perma.cc/5TTR-HZ4S] (describing fierce competition among cell phone companies for
frequencies auctioned by the government).
156. United States v. Alabi, 597 Fed. App’x 991, 993 (10th Cir. 2015). The court ultimately
did not decide the issue, reasoning that even if there was a Fourth Amendment violation, the
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These cases often do not implicate third party doctrine at all, and there are few
cases of any one type of technology. CSLI cases, by contrast, are numerous. 157
C. Statutory Protections
In most of these cases, law enforcement acted under the belief that
collection of the data in question falls outside the Fourth Amendment and
therefore is not a search. In 1986, in response to cases like Smith, Congress
attempted to provide statutory protections beyond Fourth Amendment
protections, with the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). 158 A
brief description of these statutory protections will be helpful in understanding
some of the cases that comprise the cell phone location data controversy.
The ECPA includes three portions: The Pen Register Act, the Wire Tap
Act, and the Stored Communications Act (SCA). 159 The Pen Register Act and
the SCA offer limited protections for this type of electronic information
voluntarily given to third parties (usually the telephone or internet service
provider). The SCA allows law enforcement to obtain a court order compelling
the third party to turn over that data with a showing of reasonable suspicion. 160
More specifically, the SCA says that police can compel the third party carrier
to turn over non-content information 161 without the customer’s consent 162 and
without giving the customer notice 163 either by obtaining a warrant in the
normal way which requires a showing of probable cause, 164 by obtaining a
court order under the lesser standard of “specific and articulable facts,” 165 with
no requirement of showing anything when the data is limited to specific
metadata, 166 and finally by formal request when the data is relevant to an
evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule. Id. at
998.
157. See infra Part IV.0.
158. Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 134, at 1209–13. While Arner says the ECPA was a
response to Katz, she notes that it was not enacted until eighteen years after Katz. Arner, supra
note 51, at 358.
159. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2520 (2012);
Arner, supra note 51, at 359.
160. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012).
161. Id. § 2703(c).
162. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(C).
163. Id. § 2703(c)(3).
164. Id. § 2703 (c)(1)(A).
165. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (2012) (referring to the standard in §2703(d)).
166. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(E) (referring to the list of specific data given in § 2703(c)(2)). That list
includes only the name and address of the account holder (as given by the account holder,
something not necessarily verified by the company, especially when the cell phone is a pre-paid
type obviating the need for a credit check), call metadata (connection time, duration of call),
subscriber’s phone number (or account number or other such subscriber ID), and, upon obtaining
a grand jury or trial subpoena or any of the other means described in this section (that is, warrant,
consent, court order on “specific and articulable facts,” or with notice to the subscriber), the
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investigation in a telemarketing fraud case defined elsewhere in the Chapter. 167
Furthermore, violations of the SCA are not necessarily enforceable by
excluding the evidence gained. 168 The Pen Register Act requires only a
showing that the information is relevant to an investigation for installing pen
registers which collect just one type of third party data: telephone numbers to
and from which calls are made. 169
Since the ECPA offers lower protections, the third party doctrine is hugely
important in determining whether electronic data transmitted by cell phones
gets Fourth Amendment protection. Analysis should begin by determining
whether or not law enforcement’s conduct falls inside or outside of the Fourth
Amendment. In these cases, this determination invariably depends on whether
or not the third party doctrine applies. If the third party doctrine applies, and it
is not a Fourth Amendment search, then the court should then proceed to see
whether law enforcement complied with statutory requirements.
D. The Cases
1.

Historic

As recently as late 2015, more than a year after Amendment Nine’s
passage, 170 there was an arguably legitimate circuit split on the question of the
collection of historic CSLI without a warrant. While there is still some
controversy over details, the rule is that collection of CSLI records is not a

method of payment information, including credit card or bank account numbers. Id. Other than
the payment information, this is the “metadata” collected by the NSA.
167. Id. § 2703(c)(1)(D) (referring to § 2325).
168. Kerr points to “the absence of a statutory suppression remedy” as one of several
“[d]ichotomies and ambiguities” in the SCA. Kerr, A User’s Guide, supra note 134, at 1224.
169. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 generally prohibits pen register and trap and trace without a court order
as provided in § 3123. Section 3123 allows for a court order when the information is relevant to
an ongoing criminal investigation.
170. That is, before the Eleventh Circuit vacated its panel opinion in Davis and then reached
the opposite decision on this issue en banc, and before the Fourth Circuit vacated its decision in
Graham for an en banc decision, which is currently pending. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d
1205 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 573 Fed. App’x 925 (11th Cir.
2014) and on reh’g en banc in part, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479
(2015); United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 624 F.
App’x 75 (4th Cir. 2015); see also Orin Kerr, Fourth Circuit Grants Rehearing, Eliminates Split,
on Cell-Site Surveillance, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/29/fourth-circuit-grants-rehearing-elimi
nates-split-on-cell-site-surveillance/ [http://perma.cc/DRR5-BGTV]; United States v. Daniels,
803 F.3d 335, 351 (7th Cir. 2015) (referring to “this circuit split” characterized by the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion in Graham on the one side, and the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit opinions on the
other).
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search under the Fourth Amendment. 171 The only remaining circuit split is
over one of these peripheral questions. The following is a chronological
description of some of the key circuit court cases.
In 2010, the Third Circuit issued a confused opinion in a case involving
collection of historic CSLI. 172 The court held that collection of historic CSLI is
not protected by the Fourth Amendment and therefore the analysis proceeds
under the SCA. 173 But in construing the statute, the court held that the statute
provides the option of either obtaining a warrant by a showing of probable
cause or obtaining an order by showing “specific and articulable facts,” and
that this choice means the magistrate was not required to grant the order upon
the lesser showing. 174 However, the concurrence would limit the magistrate
judge’s discretion to require probable cause to just two situations: (1) where
the government has failed to provide the lesser standard given in the applicable
part of the SCA, or (2) where the magistrate judge finds that the order would
violate the Fourth Amendment by providing location data within the interior or
curtilage of the suspect’s home. 175 So the analysis seems to be back under the
Fourth Amendment. The court found the third party doctrine not applicable
because the site information is not “voluntarily” given to the third party since
most users are not aware location information is collected and stored. 176 At any
rate, the Third Circuit held that it was within the judge’s discretion to require
probable cause, but it also indicated that law enforcement only had to provide
reasonable suspicion under the SCA. 177
In 2013, the Fifth Circuit explicitly applied the third party rule by holding
that “cell site information is clearly a business record.” 178 This is data “[t]he
cell service provider collects and stores . . . for its own business purposes” and
not sent from the user to convey to a recipient that is “anyone other than his
service provider.” 179 Therefore, the cell phone user has no Fourth Amendment
protection for this data, and the provisions in the SCA are adequate. 180 The

171. In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614–15 (5th Cir. 2013)
[hereinafter Fifth Circuit CSLI Case].
172. Third Circuit CSLI Case, 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).
173. Id. at 313 (“[W]e hold that CSLI from cell phone calls is obtainable under a § 2703(d)
[of the SCA] order and that such an order does not require the traditional probable cause
determination. . . .”).
174. Id. at 319.
175. Id. at 320 (Tashima, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 317 (“A cell phone customer has not ‘voluntarily’ shared his location information
with a cellular provider in any meaningful way.”). The court goes on to assert, “it is unlikely that
cell phone customers are aware that their cell phone providers collect and store historical location
information.” Id.
177. Third Circuit CSLI Case, 620 F.3d at 313.
178. Fifth Circuit CSLI Case, 724 F.3d 600, 611 (5th Cir. 2013).
179. Id. at 611–12.
180. Id. at 615.
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court rejected that the user does not voluntarily give the information to the
provider. 181 The Fifth Circuit explicitly disagreed with the Third Circuit in
holding that the SCA leaves no room for the magistrate judge to require
probable cause once the SCA requirements are met. 182 In response to the idea
that we should change the third party doctrine to reflect the ease and ubiquity
of data collection due to changes in technology, the court noted that this was
outside the Fourth Amendment, and thus the realm of the legislature, which
has already acted in creating the SCA. 183
In 2014, the Eleventh Circuit held “that cell site location information is
within the subscriber’s reasonable expectation of privacy. The obtaining of that
data without a warrant is a Fourth Amendment violation.” 184 It rejected the
applicability of third party doctrine holding that the Fourth Amendment
protects “not only content, but also the transmission itself when it reveals
information about the personal source of the transmission, specifically his
location.” 185 The court asserted as a conclusion without support that users do
not voluntarily give their location information to cell phone carriers. 186
However, the Eleventh Circuit vacated this decision, and decided the case en
banc in 2015. 187 In its en banc opinion, the Eleventh Circuit found collection
of CSLI was not a search under the Fourth Amendment due to the third party

181. Id. at 612. The court supported this conclusion in several ways. First, the information is
given voluntarily for the simple fact that one is free not to use or possess a cell phone. Id. at 613.
Second, it responded to the argument that only the phone numbers actually dialed, as in Smith, are
outside the content protected by the Fourth Amendment, calling this a “crabbed understanding of
voluntary conveyance” that would “lead to absurd results.” Id. For example, if phones are
preprogrammed to dial the number automatically (as with speed dial, or simply “call” under a
phone book entry), then even the numbers the phone company needs to complete the call would
somehow be treated as not voluntarily conveyed. Id. Also, users are generally aware of when they
are out of range of towers. Id. Furthermore, coverage areas and how many bars customers get are
frequent subject matter of marketing campaigns. Not only are customers generally aware, it is
often the reason they choose a given carrier. E.g., AT&T Commercial—Across the Nation,
YOUTUBE (Mar. 29, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8c_nrA_BUz4 [http://perma.cc/6F
WP-TCQJ] (advertising “more bars in more places”—a huge marketing campaign suggesting cell
phone customers are generally aware of the importance of signal strength and availability for
providing cell phone service). Finally, the court notes that subscribers agree to a contract, which
includes terms regarding the disclosure of this information and the carrier’s privacy policy. Fifth
Circuit CSLI Case, 724 F.3d at 613.
182. Fifth Circuit CSLI Case, 724 F.3d at 607.
183. Id. at 614–15.
184. United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 573 Fed. App’x 925 (11th Cir. 2014).
185. Id. at 1213, 1216.
186. Id. at 1216–17.
187. United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
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doctrine, and even if it was a search, it is a reasonable one when law
enforcement satisfies the requirements of the SCA. 188
In August of 2015, the Fourth Circuit held that the warrantless collection
of a vast amount of CSLI was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 189 The
court reasoned that the third party doctrine did not apply because cell phone
users do not voluntarily give their location information to the phone
company. 190 The court explained that the user does not convey the information
because the phone company itself generates CSLI. 191 In October of 2015, the
Fourth Circuit vacated this opinion for hearing en banc. 192 The case is schedule
for oral argument in March of 2016. 193
Other circuit courts have disposed of cases without having to decide this
issue. 194 We can only glean hints of which way those circuits would have gone
had they reached the issue. 195
2.

Real-Time/Prospective

In 2012, in United States v. Skinner, the Sixth Circuit held that there was
no Fourth Amendment protection for prospective CSLI because there was no
reasonable expectation of privacy for location data given off by the cell
phone. 196 This holding is despite the fact that the case involved several facts
188. Id. at 517–18.
189. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344–45 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted,
624 Fed. App’x 75 (2015) (“We hold that the government conducts a search under the Fourth
Amendment when it obtains and inspects a cell phone user’s historical CSLI for an extended
period of time.”).
190. Id. at 353–55.
191. Id. at 356.
192. Graham, 624 Fed. App’x at 75.
193. Id.
194. E.g., United States v. Thousand, 558 Fed. App’x 666, 672 (7th Cir. 2014) (noting that
police provided probable cause in their SCA application anyway); United States v. Daniels, 803
F.3d 335, 352, 352 n.3 (7th Cir. 2015) (disposing of the issue because the defendant failed to
preserve it by a motion to suppress and noting that even if the rule from the now-vacated Graham
decision applied, officers relied on the SCA in good faith); Jayne v. Blunk, 502 Fed. App’x 641,
642 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to reach the issue in a § 1983 case because police withdrew their
order to turn over historic and real-time CSLI before the phone company responded); United
States v. McCullough, 523 Fed. App’x 82, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2013) (disposing of the issue based on
defendant’s failure to timely move to suppress the CSLI evidence and, in a separate ineffective
assistance of counsel argument, that officers’ good faith reliance on the SCA meant the defendant
was not prejudiced).
195. E.g., Thousand, 558 Fed. App’x at 670 (“We have not found any federal appellate
decision accepting [the defendant’s] premise that obtaining cell-site data from
telecommunications companies—under any factual scenario—raises a concern under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
196. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 777 (6th Cir. 2012). Police obtained an order
from a federal magistrate for prospective data on first one phone, then another, thus allowing
police to track the defendant’s movements in real time. Id. at 774–76.
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that might tend toward a favorable outcome for the defendant: the order was
prospective, rather than historic; the order included the collection of GPS data;
and tracking included having the phone service provider initiate “continuous
pings” to the phones. 197 The court did not invoke the third party rule; instead, it
accepted that the phones functioned as tracking devices, and distinguished the
case from Jones while analogizing to Karo. 198 The court also noted that even
though otherwise lawful tracking becomes illegal when it is long-term or
comprehensive (citing the Jones concurrences), law enforcement only tracked
Skinner for three days so such a rule would not apply here anyway. 199
In 2013, the Tenth Circuit disposed of a prospective CSLI case without
reaching the issue of concern. 200 The court invoked the officers’ good faith
reliance on the court order that mistakenly authorized collection of prospective
cell site location information. 201 The court unfortunately referred to pings
initiated by the cell phone service provide at law enforcement’s direction for
purposes of locating the phone as “GPS pings” and CSLI as “GPS data.” 202
Finally, one state case involving real-time or prospective CSLI is worth
mentioning. The Florida Supreme Court held that collecting such data requires
a warrant based on probable cause. 203 Under the Pen Register Act, law
enforcement obtained a pen register to capture numbers dialed on the suspect’s
cell phone. 204 Although officers did not request it, the phone company also
provided them with historical and real-time CSLI. 205 Officers used this

197. Id. at 776.
198. Id. at 780–81. The court indirectly brought in third party doctrine when it likened
movements in public to the phone numbers dialed in Smith in that there is no recognized
reasonable expectation of privacy. Id.
199. Id. at 780.
200. United States v. Barajas, 710 F.3d 1102, 1109 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
230 (2013).
201. Id. at 1109.
202. Based on the description of the process, the court simply meant CSLI generated by cell
tower pings expressed in terms of latitude and longitude coordinates. Id. at 1105 n.1. Latitude and
longitude coordinates are not properly “GPS coordinates” since they were in use centuries before
GPS technology. J.J. O’Connor & E.F. Robertson, History Topic: Longitude and the Académie
Royale, MACTUTOR HIST. OF MATHEMATICS ARCHIVE, U. OF ST. ANDREWS, SCOTLAND (Feb.
1997), http://www-groups.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/PrintHT/Longitude1.html [http://perma.cc/
8GSW-KM64] (“Eratosthenes calculated the Earth’s circumference and he was the first to
attempt to produce a map of the World based on a system of lines of latitude and longitude.”).
GPS location information is not generated the same way CSLI is generated. E.g., How GPS
Works, GPS.GOV, http://www.gps.gov/multimedia/poster/ [http://perma.cc/HP5F-H9DX] (last
visited Mar. 28, 2015).
203. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 507–08, 526 (Fla. 2014).
204. Id. at 507.
205. Id. at 507–08. In fact, the court order did specify historical CSLI, not requested by
officers. Id. at 508 n.2.
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information to track the suspect’s movements and location. 206 Florida held that
this was a search under the Fourth Amendment, and that the third party
doctrine did not apply because cell phone users do not voluntarily give their
location information for any purpose. 207
Despite the current absence of a circuit split on the issue of CSLI, the
minority position persists. 208
V. REFINING THE CONTROVERSY: WHAT ARE MISSOURI’S LIKELY OPTIONS?
This section is meant to be a cursory look at Missouri’s options and not an
exhaustive treatment of the questions of “voluntary gives,” prospective versus
historic data collection, or the Mosaic Theory. In other words, the issues are
refined only enough to determine whether Amendment Nine will be effective
or helpful.
A.

The vanishing “circuit split” is not a controversy whether the third party
rule is applicable to electronic data at all but merely a question as to
which data a person “voluntarily gives” to a third party carrier.
1.

The Majority Position

Whether the third party doctrine applies in CSLI cases boils down to
whether the data in question was voluntarily given to the phone service
provider. Kerr points out the need to analyze this question by analogy to
physical searches rather than developing a series of technology dependent rules
which cannot anticipate unforeseeable technological developments. 209 The best

206. Id. at 508.
207. Id. at 522 (“While a person may voluntarily convey personal information to a business or
other entity for personal purposes, such disclosure cannot reasonably be considered to be
disclosure for all purposes to third parties not involved in that transaction.”).
208. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wyatt, CRIM. A. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *7 (Mass.
Super. Aug. 7, 2012); In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 15XR-90304-HRL-1(LHK), 2015 WL 4594558, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2015); Brian L. Owsley,
Teaching Criminal Procedure—Especially on Fourth Amendment and Electronic Surveillance—
to Everyone but Law Students, 60 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 507, 511 (2016).
209. Kerr, supra note 53, at 1021–22, 1030. An example of such a rule is the language in New
York’s Fourth Amendment analog, which enumerates “telephone and telegraph communication.”
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. New York courts have found this language to have no effect (that is,
they still hold their analog’s protections to be in lockstep or limited lockstep with the Fourth
Amendment, and have not relied on this “telephone and telegraph” language to be the basis for
greater protections. If the language were effective, the provision would be long overdue for
overhaul since the telegraph is wholly obsolete and “telephone” communication is very nearly a
completely different technology than it was when the language was adopted. Gorman, supra note
64, at 447. Gorman notes that New York in fact has departed from Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence (in some significant ways), id., none of the “departures” have even a remote basis
in the “telephone and telegraph communication” language.
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analogy for data given to third party carriers is to physical letters or packages
given to the Post Office or other carriers, such as FedEx. In the physical world,
the distinction between content and non-content is the same as the distinction
between inside and outside. 210 Part of the problem with the SCA is that it
specifies different standards for content or non-content data without defining
the terms. 211 It does list with great specificity the information that it considers
to be metadata which is presumed wholly outside the Fourth Amendment. 212
But how can the courts tell whether or not Congress’ presumptions were valid?
What is a good test to distinguish content from non-content in the realm of
CSLI?
According to the Fifth Circuit, the information is “voluntarily given”
because using or carrying a cell phone at all is a voluntary matter, and cell
phone users cannot reasonably claim not to be aware that the phone is
effectively sending location information (inferable from knowing with which
tower the phone communicates). 213 The court supported its conclusion that the
data is given voluntarily. 214 For example, cell phone users should be aware of
the fact that their phones must communicate with cell towers because
“coverage” is part of cell phone service marketing. 215
The Fifth Circuit also looks at the idea of the information being part of a
business record. Although the court kept this analysis separate from the
question of “voluntarily gives,” it is really another way of looking at the same
issue. Because this is information the business must collect, generate, and store
to provide services, a person voluntarily contracting for those services
voluntarily gives that data to the business.
2.

The Minority Position

The Third Circuit seems to acknowledge that the third party doctrine is
applicable to electronic data generally, but deems the action to be a Fourth
Amendment search because data revealed the person’s location in his home or
curtilage.
The Third Circuit’s reasoning is flawed. It muddies the waters by putting
the question of whether or not the action is a search under the Fourth
Amendment back inside construction of the SCA, when the statute should only

210. Kerr, supra note 53, at 1009–12, 1020–22 (“In the physical world, the inside/outside
distinction strikes a sensible balance. It generally lets the government observe where people go,
when they go, and to whom they are communicating while protecting the actual substance of their
speech from government observation without a warrant unless the speech is made in a setting
open to the public. The content/non-content distinction preserves that function.”).
211. 18 U.S.C. § 2711 (2009) (“Definitions for chapter” fail to define “contents”).
212. Id. § 2703(c)(2).
213. Fifth Circuit CSLI Case, 724 F.3d 600, 613 (5th Cir. 2013).
214. Id. at 614.
215. See, e.g., AT&T Commercial—Across the Nation, supra note 181.
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apply when there is no Fourth Amendment search. That is, the statute can only
add additional protections, and cannot displace the Fourth Amendment. The
proper analysis should begin with the determination of whether or not the third
party doctrine applies, and therefore whether or not there is a Fourth
Amendment search. Only if there is not a search is the SCA controlling (other
than a likely good faith exception to the exclusionary rule because law
enforcement relied on the statute). Put another way, if the third party doctrine
applies and the action is therefore not a search under the Fourth Amendment,
the fact that the information lies inside the home or curtilage cannot drag it
back into the Fourth Amendment. Again, Katz said a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in matters made known to others, even in the home or
office. 216
Furthermore, the Third Circuit and Eleventh Circuit panels made the
relatively bald assertion that CSLI data is not voluntarily given. They seemed
to rely on confusing “awareness” with the question of “voluntarily gives.”
While the Fifth Circuit makes a strong case that such knowledge is reasonable
to infer, strictly speaking actual knowledge or awareness—especially at any
given moment—is not required. Focusing on actual or subjective awareness
this way would absurdly hamstring law enforcement even in long settled areas
of physical searches. For example, that a criminal is genuinely unaware that his
actions in his home or curtilage are readily observable from the public street is
irrelevant in determining whether that observation constitutes a search.217
The Florida Supreme Court made a similarly confused argument.
Construing the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of “voluntarily gives” as a question of
the purpose for giving the data to the third party, Florida then confused this
notion of purpose with the question of consent to a search. 218 That is, whether
one “voluntarily gives” location data to the carrier depends on whether one
consents to law enforcement collecting that data. 219 Like the Third Circuit,
Florida was asking questions that only apply when there is a search in order to
determine whether or not there is a search; it was simultaneously reasoning
inside and outside the Fourth Amendment.

216. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”).
217. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–52 (1989).
218. Tracey v. State, 152 So. 3d 504, 522 (Fla. 2014).
219. Id. (“While a person may voluntarily convey personal information to a business or other
entity for personal purposes, such disclosure cannot reasonably be considered to be disclosure for
all purposes to third parties not involved in that transaction.”). This confusion of “voluntarily
gives” and “consent” is illustrated where Tracey quotes with approval Third Circuit CSLI Case,
“The fiction that the vast majority of the American population consents to warrantless
government access to the records of a significant share of their movements by ‘choosing’ to carry
a cell phone must be rejected.” Id.
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Whether data collection is prospective or historic might matter

Another option facing Missouri is whether or not it matters if police collect
historic/stored data as opposed to prospective/real-time data. When law
enforcement collects historic location information, they are dealing with stored
business records. When they collect data prospectively, the argument goes,
they are effectively using the cell phone as a tracking device.
C. The Mosaic Theory is another layer to the analysis whose moment has not
yet come
The Mosaic Theory posits that when law enforcement collect massive
quantities of data or monitors someone continuously for a long period of time,
and such actions would not otherwise constitute a Fourth Amendment search,
they can infringe on a reasonable expectation of privacy by drawing a gestalt
picture from the aggregation of data. 220 In the metaphor, while the collection of
any individual tile is not a search, putting enough tiles together reveals an
image. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts. While there is no
societally-recognized expectation of privacy in any of the tiles, there may be
one in the mosaic. The doctrine reached prominence in Justice Sotomayor’s
concurrence in the Jones case. 221 After that, two district courts adopted the
theory, 222 at least in name. 223 The Fourth Circuit then adopted a version of the
Mosaic Theory in its now-vacated decision in Graham. 224

220. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in part sub nom;
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
221. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955–56.
222. Orin Kerr, Two District Courts Adopt the Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/18/two-district-courts-adopt-the-mosaic-theory-of-the-fourthamendment/ [http://perma.cc/EN79-URHX].
223. Both of these cases depended more on the length of time of surveillance rather than on
the aggregation of data. United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 623–24, 628 (E.D. Mich.
2014); Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, 2:13-cr-06025EFS (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014), ECF No. 106, http://www.eff.org/files/2014/12/15/vargas_
order.pdf [http://perma.cc/B9BB-72BZ]. Although Sotomayor in Jones speaks of aggregating the
data, she does not use the term “mosaic.” Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–57. Elsewhere Kerr refers to
the “Long Term Katz Search” rather than Mosaic Theory. Orin Kerr, Does Fourth Amendment
Standing Work Differently for Jones Trespass Searches, Traditional Katz Searches, and LongTerm Katz Searches, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 14, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/02/14/doesfourth-amendment-standing-work-differently-for-jones-trespass-searches-traditional-katz-search
es-and-katz-long-term-expectation-of-privacy-searches/ [http://perma.cc/4FBF-X76G]. When, as
in Vargas, police are trying to catch a single fish rather than emergent properties of the school of
fish, I prefer to think of long-term surveillance as a “dragnet” rather than a “mosaic.”
224. United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 349 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc granted, 124659 L, 2015 WL 6531272 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015) (recognizing a Fourth Amendment privacy
interest in “long-term CSLI”).
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VI. AMENDMENT NINE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT: MISSOURI LIKELY WILL WAIT
UNTIL A BINDING FEDERAL COURT EXPLICITLY ACCEPTS OR REJECTS THE
MOSAIC THEORY OR A RULE DISTINGUISHING HISTORIC FROM PROSPECTIVE
DATA
At this point, it is obvious that Amendment Nine will not help Missouri
answer any of these questions. None of the questions hinge on whether
something is electronic data or electronic communication as opposed to the
conventional areas protected by the Fourth Amendment. Amendment Nine
proponents were wrong in assuming electronic data and communications did
not already fall under Fourth Amendment and Missouri’s coextensive
protection. That Amendment Nine will be no help is supported by a look at
some recent Missouri CSLI cases.
A.

Missouri has already adopted the Fifth Circuit’s position with regard to
historic data

Missouri has so routinely treated historic cell phone data as business
records obtainable by subpoena that most of these cases did not even raise
search and seizure questions (under the Fourth Amendment or the Missouri
Constitution). 225 In each of these cases, law enforcement obtained historic
CSLI without a warrant. 226 In each case, police used the data to “place” the
defendant at a certain location. 227 The cases reached the appellate court over
questions surrounding expert opinion that the records could prove the location
of the cell phone. 228 In none of these cases did the defendant even move to
suppress the records themselves as illegal searches or seizures. At least with
respect to historic CSLI data, Missouri has already accepted the Fifth Circuit’s
approach. Relying on the business records approach, Missouri seems to assume
that the cell phone user has no privacy interest in the data; rather, the data as
information kept in business records belongs wholly to the cell phone
company. Amendment Nine cannot change that. Again, saying the records
belong to the company is tantamount to saying the user has voluntarily given
the data to the company.

225. See State v. Manzella, 128 S.W.3d 602, 605–06 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); Midgyett v. State,
392 S.W.3d 8, 10–12 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Patton, 419 S.W.3d 125, 128–29 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2013), reh’g and/or transfer denied (Nov. 19, 2013), transfer denied (Feb. 25, 2014); State
v. Ford, 454 S.W.3d 407, 410 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
226. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent at 15, State v. Patton, 419 S.W.3d 125 (Mo. Ct. App.
2013) (No. ED98051), 2013 WL 3363827 (“Prior to trial, the State filed records from AT&T for
Defendant’s cell phone along with a business records affidavit from AT&T’s custodian of records
pursuant to § 490.692, RSMo. 2000.”).
227. Manzella, 128 S.W.3d at 606; Midgyett, 392 S.W.3d at 13–14 n.3; Patton, 419 S.W.3d at
132; Ford, 454 S.W.3d at 413–14.
228. Manzella, 128 S.W.3d at 609; Midgyett, 392 S.W.3d at 11; Patton, 419 S.W.3d at 128–
29, 131–32; Ford, 454 S.W.3d at 414.
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Missouri has not decided the question regarding prospective CSLI

State v. Hosier recently presented the Missouri Supreme Court with a
prospective collection of CSLI case. 229 The court disposed of the case that
offered a challenge to the application of third party doctrine to police
collection of cell phone location information pursuant to a warrantless order
without reaching the underlying question. 230 In Hosier, the defendant was a
suspect in a double murder that took place in Missouri. 231 Police in Missouri
obtained an order under the SCA for the cell phone company to “ping” the
suspect’s cell phone and thereby provide police with real-time location
information based on which cell towers received the ping response—that is, to
track his location. 232 Based on that order, Oklahoma police located and stopped
the suspect driving on public roads in Oklahoma and discovered evidence in
his car. 233 The defense sought to quash this evidence as the fruit of the
poisonous tree of the warrantless search. 234 The state argued that under third
party doctrine the ping information is only protected by the SCA requirements
and not by the Fourth Amendment, and, in the alternative, even if it were
protected, officers presented probable cause in their SCA order application
anyway. 235
The case facts gave the court several options to duck the question of
interest here, and it exploited one of them. 236 When Oklahoma police activated
their siren and beacons to stop Hosier, Hosier sped off. 237 Police chased him
until he eventually did pull over. 238 Even if collection of the cell phone
location information under the lesser standard of the SCA was a Fourth

229. State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883, 890 (Mo. 2015), reh’g denied (Mar. 31, 2015), cert.
denied, 136 S. Ct. 37 (2015).
230. Id. at 892.
231. Id. at 888.
232. Id. at 891–92.
233. Id. at 891.
234. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 892.
235. Brief of Respondent at 46, 52–53, 62–64, State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883 (Mo. 2014)
(No. SC93855), 2014 WL 4793514; Oral Argument, State v. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d 883 (Mo. 2014)
(No. SC93855), http://www.courts.mo.gov/SUP/index.nsf/fe8feff4659e0b7b8625699f0079eddf/
058ddfb765acf27c86257d3800556085/$FILE/SC93855.mp3 [http://perma.cc/X4VW-HAWF].
236. The court could also have ducked the issue by finding that police did provide evidence of
probable cause in obtaining the ping order since they had probable cause for a warrant to search
Hosier’s apartment, or conversely that police failed even to provide the lesser SCA standard on
the other. It could also have employed the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See
Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 888, 891–92.
237. Id. at 890.
238. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2016]

THE FALSE HOPE OF MISSOURI’S AMENDMENT NINE

769

Amendment violation, the taint of that violation was purged by the
circumstances, and the evidence should be admitted. 239
So Hosier only makes clear the fact that “[n]o Missouri state court has
ruled on this issue.” 240 Given the above cases on historic CSLI, the “issue” the
court refers to is strictly prospective data. In its very brief discussion of this
unanswered question, the court did not cite Fifth Circuit CSLI Case, but only
Barajas, the Tenth Circuit case, which dealt with prospective CSLI
collection. 241
Under strict third party doctrine, it should not matter whether the data
collected is historic or prospective. Indeed, in the seminal case developing the
doctrine, Smith, the data was prospective (as are by definition all pen register
or trap and trace orders). What keeps this issue an open question in Missouri is
a failure to see the connection between treating the data as business records
and the third party doctrine. A holding that prospective/real-time collection of
CSLI is a search under the Fourth Amendment would be a new rule, and would
be inconsistent with Smith or the Pen Register Act, absent some way of
distinguishing cell phone records from pen register data (such as application of
a version of the Mosaic doctrine to long-term prospective CSLI). Since the Pen
Register Act requires only reasonable suspicion (“specific and articulable
facts”) and not probable cause, 242 the new rule would require finding that
statute to be unconstitutional. However, since Amendment Nine makes no
distinction between historic/stored or prospective/real-time electronic data or
communications, it will have no effect on whether or not Missouri accepts this
possible new rule. I predict Missouri will maintain its “coextensive” and “thesame-analysis-applies” approach and refrain from giving any effect to
Amendment Nine’s language. Missouri will likely wait for a broader
consensus—either by more federal circuit courts or by the United States
Supreme Court—on whether collection of CSLI is a search under the Fourth
Amendment. 243

239. Whether evidence collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be “purged of the
taint” of that violation depended on a three-factor test. The court found two of the factors
persuasive: the intervening event of the car chase when Hosier fled the Oklahoma police car, and
the fact that the violation, if it existed, was done pursuant to the SCA in the context of a circuit
split on this question, so it was not a flagrant abuse by police. Id. at 892–93. Note that the last
factor is really a version of the “good faith” exception nearly always available when police relied
in good faith on the SCA order and case law suggesting this practice is legal.
240. Id. at 892.
241. Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 892.
242. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (2012) (referring to the standard in §2703(d)).
243. Because review of most of these cases by the Missouri Supreme Court is discretionary,
the court need not accept them when the facts do not allow them an “out” to avoid deciding this
issue. These cases nearly always offer the good faith exception so even when purging the taint is
not available, there is nearly always an “out.” E.g., Hosier, 454 S.W.3d at 892.
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C. Amendment Nine will have no effect on whether Missouri adopts the
Mosaic Theory
Missouri courts have not looked at the Mosaic Theory at all as of this
writing. Since the Mosaic Theory relies on the fact that electronic technology
makes possible the unobtrusive collection of great quantities of data at
extremely low cost to law enforcement, Amendment Nine would seem to be
helpful. Since we have to presume a change in the language of a constitution or
statute has an effect, at first glance, it seems obvious that Amendment Nine
cuts in favor of adopting the Mosaic Theory. There are two reasons why
Amendment Nine should have no effect at all on this question.
First, the Mosaic Theory’s focus is on the electronic (and therefore cheap
and unobtrusive) nature of the collection rather than on the nature of the data.
While NSA’s wholesale collection of phone call metadata targets electronic
data, other cases invoking the Mosaic Theory do not. In Jones, the data
generated was the movement of a vehicle on public roads. 244 Although that
information can be reduced to electronic data, it did not start out as electronic
data belonging to the suspect. In Vargas, the technology involved installation
of a camera, but the data collected was digital imagery of the suspect’s
movements in parts of his front yard readily visible from a public road. 245
Amendment Nine would make that suspect’s electronic data and
communications as secure as his home, but here the government collected no
such electronic data.
Second, for Amendment Nine to have any effect, the Mosaic Theory would
have to create a greater degree of protection for electronic data; it could not
elevate protection to a position equal to that of the “person, home, papers, and
effects” because it already has that same protection. The theory that
Amendment Nine would help relies on the fact that electronic data is more
readily shared with third parties, even unwittingly. The Mosaic Theory would
suspend the third party doctrine in data collection that would not otherwise
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. Non-electronic information
shared with third parties does not enjoy that carve out, at least not if we rely on
Amendment Nine to adopt the Mosaic Theory. Therefore, if Missouri is to
abide by the ballot language of Amendment Nine and give electronic data and
communications the same protections previously extended to “persons, homes,
papers, and effects,” Missouri must either adopt the Mosaic Theory across the
board or not at all. Therefore, adding “electronic data” and “electronic
communications” to the list would only prevent Missouri from adopting the
Mosaic Theory for everything other than electronic data, something it could

244. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
245. Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, United States v. Vargas, 2:13-cr06025-EFS (W.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014), ECF No. 106, http://www.eff.org/files/2014/12/15/var
gas_order.pdf [http://perma.cc/22V6-M4GU].
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not do under its current “coextensive” and “the analysis is the same” approach
to state constitutional protections.
CONCLUSION
Amendment Nine will likely have no more than expressive effect. It was
based on the false assumption that neither the Missouri Constitution nor Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence considered electronic data and electronic
communications to be protected. Since Missouri and federal protections
already extended to electronic data and communications, Amendment Nine
does nothing. Furthermore, it will not help guide Missouri in answering any of
the unanswered questions involving federal Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
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